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Abstract: The authors study the investment incentives of energy policy in Germany and 
how this affects competition, the environment and supply adequacy. First, after a long 
period of ‘self-regulation’, the new Energy Act of 2005 installs a regulator and network 
regulation. Second, Germany has a strong agenda for the environment. Furthermore, the 
CO2 emission trading scheme has significant effects. Third, despite international debate, 
Germany does not have an explicit policy on generation adequacy. The key conclusions 
are threefold. The initial position of Germany to refrain from regulating network access 
did  not  work  satisfactorily.  The  recent  creation  of  regulation  can  be  welcomed  and 
expected  to  stimulate  competition  and  generation  investment.  As  elsewhere,  CO2 
permits are allocated  free-of-charge, both for existing and new plants. This may be 
inefficient, but promotes new investment and thus benefits competition and generation 
adequacy. The data suggests that new generation investment will be required, but also 
that the market is active. Apart from wind and CHP, coal seems to have a brighter 
future than sometimes thought. 
 
                                                 
1  The authors would like to thank Paul Joskow, Wolfgang Pfaffenberger and Perry Sioshansi for useful 
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1  Introduction 
The  debate  on  electric  power  markets  seems  to  be  shifting  towards  the  long  term 
perspective:  does  the  market  provide  timely,  adequate  and  efficient  investment? 
Investment  (covering  both  generation  and  network  assets)  affects  competition,  the 
environment and supply adequacy. In this contribution we analyse and discuss German 
energy policy with precisely this focus in mind. Evidently, German energy policy does 
not stand alone, but rather strongly relies on European policy. The policies we examine 
are  threefold.  First,  the  competition  and  network  regulation  of  the  electric  power 
market,  which  changed  direction  in  2005.  Whereas  Germany  initially  took  an 
exceptional position within Europe, it is now more in line with neighbouring countries. 
Second, environmental policy and in particular the start of the CO2 emission trading 
scheme  deserves  attention.  Germany  has  a  strong  agenda  for  promoting 
environmentally-friendly technologies and energy efficiency. The question is how much 
scope remains for pursuing these objectives. Third, it is noteworthy that there is no 
policy on generation adequacy; in the light of experience and growing concern in other 
countries the question is whether this is justifiable. 
The capacity margins are now declining but still comfortable, stemming as they 
do from excess generation capacity before liberalisation. Investment levels have been 
picking up again in the last two years after a serious decline in the previous five years 
which followed on from an all-time high as a result of modernizing the former east 
following  re-unification  in  1990.  This  may  reflect  better  competitive  opportunities 
indicated by higher wholesale prices. More worrying is that generation assets are old 
and need to be replaced, while it is unclear what should replace these. The share of coal 
and lignite in the generation mix is already large. The CO2 reductions required by the 
Kyoto protocol raise doubt about the future of coal. The share of nuclear is already 30% 
and is being phased out, while new build lacks support. Support for renewables is strong 
but it is unclear whether this has sufficient scope. 
Our  key  conclusions  are  also  threefold.  The  initial  exceptional  position  of 
Germany to refrain from (ex-ante, sector-specific) regulating network access did not 
work satisfactorily. Clearly, the institutions were not in equilibrium. The recent creation 
of a regulator (the Bundesnetzagentur) and regulation (with the new Energy Act of July 
13, 2005) can only be welcomed. For a variety of reasons, network regulation must be   3 
expected to promote competition and thereby stimulate new investment by newcomers. 
We note that the wholesale margin increases. 
As elsewhere, CO2 permits are allocated free-of-charge (instead of auctioned), 
both for existing plants as well as for new investment. Evidently this has a political 
background  and  cannot  be  supported  on  economic  grounds.  Still,  a  free-of-charge 
allocation does promote new investment, and thus it may be inefficient, but benefits 
competition and generation adequacy. A curiosity is the so-called transfer rule which 
grants new (CO2 poor) plant the number CO2 permits of the CO2 rich plant it replaces. 
This is good for the environment, but sets new entrants at a serious disadvantage. 
With  respect  to  generation  adequacy  (taking  into  account  the  points  made 
above), we note that data suggests that new investment is required, but also that (as 
elsewhere) there appears to be a lot of new construction plans. Apart from wind and 
CHP, new coal seems to have, perhaps surprisingly, a brighter future than sometimes 
thought. 
The organisation of this contribution is as follows. Section 2 provides an overview 
of the recent history and the current state of the German electricity supply industry 
(ESI). Section 3 gives an in-depth examination of various energy policies distinguishing 
between  the  Energy  Act,  environment  policies  and  generation  adequacy.  Section  3 
includes analysis of the investment effects. Section 4 is the conclusion. 
2  The German electricity supply industry 
2.1  How the sector is structured 
With a population of 82 million, Germany has the largest power market in Europe. 
Total  net  electricity  consumption  is  around  500  TWh/yr;  installed  gross  capacity  is 
around 140 GW including more than 15 GW wind capacity – more than any other 
country in absolute terms. Peak load in 2004 was at 77.2 GW. Total gross revenues in 
the sector are roughly € 60bn/yr and investment amounts to around € 4bn/yr. 
Germany’s  transmission  network  is  integrated  with  that  of  9  neighbouring 
countries.  Imports  and  exports  are  more  or  less  balanced,  with  a  total  of  44  TWh 
imports and 51 TWh exports in 2004. The exchange with France, the Netherlands and 
the Austrian and Swiss hydro systems is especially significant (see Table 1).  
   4 
Table 1:   German power imports and exports (in TWh) 
  imports 2004  exports 2004  imports 2003  exports 2003 
Austria  4.4  8.9  3.3  9.9 
Switzerland  2.8  11.8  3.1  13.2 
France  15.5  0.4  20.2  0.2 
Luxembourg  0.8  4.9  0.8  5.0 
Netherlands  0.6  17.3  0.6  15.0 
Denmark  5.3  3.4  4.0  5.4 
Czech Republic  13.1  0.1  12.8  0.1 
Poland  0.4  3.2  0.3  2.8 
Sweden  1.3  1.5  0.6  2.2 
Total  44.2  51.5  45.7  53.8 
Source: VDN 
 
The main energy source for power generation is coal, which accounts for around 
50% of electricity production, with hard coal and lignite each accounting for about half 
of this (Figure 1). Germany has substantial domestic coal reserves. Yet German hard 
coal  is  about  three  to  four  times  as  expensive  as  imported  coal  and  relies  on  state 
subsidies. Since the number of miners has become too small to be a serious interest 
group
2 and the hard coal subsidy is a state aid and is for this reason not favoured by the 
EU  commission
3,  the  subsidy  is  gradually  reduced.  This  will  not  influence  the 
generation mix or investment decisions, which are based on the price of imported coal, 
but will reduce domestic coal consumption and increase coal imports. 
Lignite is the only other major domestic energy source in Germany. As it can be 
accessed  through  open-cast  mines,  it  is  relatively  cheap  and  does  not  require  state 
subsidies
4. The downside is that open-cast mines consume vast chunks of land, leading 
to significant public opposition. The RWE utility in the West and Vattenfall utilityin the 
East are the main lignite producers and generators. While there was a major overhaul of 
plants  in  Eastern  Germany  after  reunification,  RWE  operates  a  much  older  fleet  of 
lignite plants, with quite a few plants approaching their 50th anniversary. 
                                                 
2  In 2003, there were just over 50,000 people working in hard coal mining and processing and around 
15,000 in lignite. The number of employees is bound to decrease further. 
3  Cf. EU Regulation, No. 1407/2002; July 23, 2002. 
4  There are no official and explicit subisdies, yet it can be argued that there is hidden financial support 
(Wuppertal Institut, 2004).   5 
Nuclear plants generate about one third of the total power production. However, 
the red-green government coalition agreed on a nuclear phase-out program which was 
laid  down  in  the  2001  amendment  of  the  nuclear  law.  The  agreement  stipulates  a 
generation  limit  based  on  a  32-year  plant  operation,  which  means  that  nuclear 
generation  will  be  phased-out  at  around  2020  according  to  this  plan.  However, 
companies have the option to shift generation allowances between plants to increase the 
output in more efficient plants. In mid 2005, only two plants – Stade and Obrigheim – 
were closed. The Conservative party has announced that it wants to do away with this 
agreement and extend the plants’ life time. However, with the likely new conservative-
socialist coalition it is unclear what will happen. 
There has been no ‘dash for gas’ yet, with gas still accounting for only around 
10%  of  power  generation.  There  are  only  a  few  CCGT  plants.  With  only  minor 
domestic gas supplies and a high dependency on gas imports, mainly from Russia, the 
Netherlands and Norway, there is some concern that an increasing share of gas may 
undermine supply security. Despite this, generation from gas is forecasted to increase in 
most scenarios. For instance, a report for the Ministry of Economics [BMWA, 2005, p. 
33] projects a share of gas of about 33% by 2030. 
 





















Source: Brunekreeft & Twelemann, 2005 
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The remaining power is generated from hydro plants and a rapidly increasing 
share  of  ‘new’  renewables,  especially  wind.  The  above  mentioned  report  for  the 
Ministry  of  Economics  also  projects  a  share  of  about  33%  for  renewables  in  2030. 
Demand growth is relatively low at around 1 % per year and is expected to remain at 
this level
5. Combined Heat and Power has a production share of about 10%
6, of which 
60% is gas fuelled and 40% hard coal (and lignite) fuelled (Figure 2). There are no 
official statistics on distributed generation, but the generation share is reported to be at 
around 18% [Wade, 2005]. 
 
Figure 2:  Combined-Heat-and-Power Generation 
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Not including industrial plants 
 
Implementing the EU Directive of 1996, the German ESI was liberalized in 1998 with 
the Energy  Act of 1998. The sector was never  institutionally monopolized (like for 
instance the UK). Instead competition in a relatively unconcentrated and fragmented 
industry was excluded by cartels agreements, which were stabilized by legally enforced 
demarcation contracts.  The main step of liberalization was to invalidate these cartel 
                                                 
5  Source: VDEW (www.strom.de) 
6  This does not include industrial plants, which are often CHP plants.   7 
agreements after which the ESI fell under the authority of the Cartel Office and the 
Competition Act. 
 
Figure 3:  German Transmission System Operators  
 
Source: VDN 
1: EnBW Transportnetze AG; 2 E.ON Netz GmbH; 3 RWE Transportnetz Strom GmbH; 4 Vattenfall 
Europe Transmission GmbH 
   8 
The  industry  structure,  which  was  artificially  stabilized  by  the  demarcation 
contracts, strongly reflected historical institutional lines; roughly speaking, generation 
and  transmission  reflected  the  position  of  the  states  within  the  federal  structure  of 
Germany, while distribution and retail reflected the strong position of the communities. 
Not surprisingly and as we have seen elsewhere, competitive pressure and commercial 
interests enforced significant changes in the industry structure after liberalization, most 
notably  towards  more  concentration.  Vertically,  the  ESI  was  strongly  integrated 
between networks and commercial businesses and if anything this has increased since 
liberalization; it is thus remarkable that the Energy Act of 1998 only required minimal 
vertical unbundling requirements. We will discuss this in more detail below. 
 
The  German  ESI  is  strongly  vertically  integrated.  There  are  basically  two 
blocks, which is depicted in Figure 4. On the one hand, four predominantly privately-
owned  big  utilities  own  and  operate  the  high-voltage  transmission  grids  (plus  the 
interconnectors) and most of the power plants (usually in their own control area). These 
firms are both Transmission System Operators (the TSOs) and dominant generators. 
They  operate  the  balancing  market  in  their  own  control  area.  There  is  an  ongoing 
discussion about separating these balancing markets and merging them into a national 
balancing market. Together these four companies own about 90% of total generation 
capacity  (Table  2).  Moreover,  they  also  have  majority  shares  in  many  distribution 
networks and retail activities. These four utilities are RWE, E.On, EnBW and Vattenfall 
Europe. 
 
On the other hand, a vast number of predominantly municipality-owned firms 
(Stadtwerke)  own  and  operate  the  distribution  networks  and,  as  end-user  switching 
away  from  the  incumbent  retailer  has  been  low,  mostly  the  retail  activities  in  the 
subsequent host areas.
7 As we will argue below, and as also noted by Haas et.al. [2005] 
the high degree of vertical integration led to cross-subsidization between networks and 
generation, stifling competition. 
 
                                                 
7  The exact number is unclear. VDN, the association of network operators, has 390 members. Also, 
VDN lists in its publication of network charges 700 different networks some of which fall under the 
same holding though. VDEW, another industry association mentions 900 firms.    9 
Figure 4:  A stylized representation of the ESI in Germany 
 
 
Most of the municipal utilities were considered to be too small and expected to 
disappear quickly after liberalisation. However, most of them have done much better 
than expected, setting up various alliances to defend their market position and to be able 
to take part in wholesale trading and realise economies of scale, for example in billing. 
The vertically integrated ‘Stadtwerke’ also responded to market opening by lowering 
the retail margins (being the difference between the end-user price and network charge 
plus wholesale price), making life for new third-party retailers difficult. Cumulative 
domestic switching rates are reported to be 5%. 
Mergers and acquisitions have increased concentration in generation since the 
beginning of liberalization (see Table 2). Around 2000, two big mergers, creating the 
current firms RWE and E.On, pushed the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index to more than 
2500.
8 
2.2  The institutional steps 
Germany implemented the 1996 EU Electricity Directive with the Energy Act of 
1998, of which three aspects stood out. First, full market opening. For generation this is 
unsurprising, but 100% end-user eligibility from the start was exceptional in 1998. Even 
early  2005,  only  9  European  Member  States  had  full  retail  market  opening.  And 
although the EU E-Directive 2003 aims at full retail market opening by 2007, we expect 
that there will be a debate on whether this will be pursued. Full retail competition in 
Germany worked well technically, but competition developed only slowly for domestic 
and small commercial end-users. Second, whilst the degree of vertical integration of 
monopolistic networks and commercial businesses is high and increasing, the rules on 
Retail 
4 Verbundunternehmen (VUs) 
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unbundling  were  weak  and  were  not  enforced.  Third,  being  the  exception  within 




Table 2:   Market shares in generation (percentages of output)  










VEBA  16.92  13.96  21.36  18.77 
VIAG 
} E.ON 
11.23  8.27  12.55  9.97 
} 28.74 
RWE  31.38  28.42  31.53  28.94 
VEW 
} RWE 
7.24  6.65  8.84  8.33 
} 37.27 
EVS  4.89  4.30 
Badenwerk 
} EnBW 
4.91  4.32 
} 9.64  } 8.60  } 8.60 
HEW  3.55  2.96  3.09  2.57 
BEWAG  2.87  2.28  2.65  2.13 
VEAG 
} V’FALL 
-  11.84  -  10.33 
} 15.03 
Other  17.00  17.00  10.35  10.35  10.35 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
HHI  1807  1595  1903  1658  2622 
Source: Brunekreeft & Twelemann. 2005, p. 103. 
Note: The shares have been corrected for participation rates. Pre means Pre-merger and Post means 
Post-merger. V’Fall is Vattenfall 
 
Negotiated TPA implied that, despite the monopolistic networks, the sector was 
left without sector-specific regulation and regulator. The government trusted the ESI to 
resolve network access and network charges by voluntary negotiations controlled by the 
Cartel  Office.  Network  access  had  to  be  arranged  collectively  in  the  so-called 
association agreements (VV). Initially, these arranged the (technical and administrative) 
rules  but  not  the  price  of  network  access.  Later,  a  set  of  accounting  principles  to 
calculate the network access charges was added to the VV. At no stage though was the 
precise  level  of  network  charges  agreed  upon  or  laid  down.  These  were  the  sole 
responsibility of the individual network owners. 
                                                                                                                                               
8   In European merger control a post-merger HHI of 2000 and in the USA of 1800 are crucial thresholds. 
Note however that these are very rough indications, which neglect many details.   
9   Cf.  Haas  et.al.  [2005]  for  a  European  overview.  Moreover,  Brunekreeft  [2003,  pp.  208  ff.] 
contemplates on possible explanations for this exceptional position; it is rather likely that the re-
unification in 1990 contributes to an explanation.   11 
Both the network access and the network charges were controlled by the Cartel 
Office. To facilitate this task, the Competition Act was strengthened with an essential 
facilities doctrine in 1998, which requires that access to the network should be provided 
on non-discriminatory terms and at a fair and reasonable charge. This one clause in the 
Competition Act was the main regulatory instrument.
10 
Control  was  not  strong  and  network  charges  were  (and  in  fact  still  are) 
persistently high. The Cartel Office faced  a number of problems [Bundeskartellamt, 
2001]. First, it is allowed to act only after a justified suspicion of abuse; hence, it can 
act only ex post. Second, with up to 900 networks to be controlled, the Cartel Office 
was  seriously  understaffed  for  this  task.  Third,  many  of  communal  and  regional 
networks  enjoy  political  support  from  the  states  and  communities.  Fourth,  the 
Competition Act is well suited to address discriminatory behaviour; the more persistent 
problem  however  turned  out  to  be  the  high  level  of  the  network  charges,  which  is 
difficult  to  address  with  the  Competition  Act.  Lastly,  accounting  according  to  the 
association agreement received legal validity, which in practice weakened the position 
of the Cartel Office. 
  After  a  series  of  events  and  reports,  the  so-called  Monitoring  Report  of  the 
Ministry of Economics paved the way to stronger regulation in 2003. Parallel to this, the 
German government gave up its resistance in Brussels and the European Commission 
seized the opportunity to remove negotiated TPA from the directive. Hence, the new EU 
E-Directive 2003 exclusively allows regulated TPA. This is also the key development 
which led to the new Energy Act which entered into force on 13 July 2005. 
2.3  Past, present and future 
Figure 5 plots an interesting development. Shortly after liberalisation end–user prices 
(net of taxes) fell strongly, but started rising again shortly afterwards and quite steeply 
since a year or so.
11 The figure depicts the representative domestic user of Eurostat and 
relies on Eurostat data. This implies that it only captures the non-switching part of the 
market, which are still under the old tariff regime. It does not capture the prices of the 
competitors  and  thus  the  prices  for  switching  end-users.  As  shown  elsewhere 
[Brunekreeft, 2003, p. 220], the best-practice alternative offers undercut the incumbent 
                                                 
10   This is not unlike the situation in the USA under the Energy Policy Act 1992. Order 888 of 1996 
made a strong move towards regulation of network charges [cf. Joskow, 2005a]. 
11  Cf. also Growitsch & Müsgens [2005] for more details.   12 
price  severely  at  first,  but  then  started  to  increase  and  converge.  Meanwhile  the 
difference is small. Further we should remark that the domestic market excludes the 
industrial users. The pattern for industrial prices is the same but far more dramatic. 
Industrial prices have fallen severely but are now increasing steeply as well. 
 




































































































Germany w/o tax EU 15 w/o tax Germany with E-tax
 
Source: Eurostat data, various years 
Note: this is for an average domestic end user; eurocent/kWh. Nominal prices. 
 
A steady increase of the electricity tax is an important contributor to higher prices. It has 
been raised gradually over the last six years to up to 2.05 €cents per kWh, which makes 
up  somewhat  more  than  11%  of  the  total  price.  Further  substantial  parts  are  the 
communal concession fee and the federal value added tax; however, these are stable and 
do not explain the increase. While these taxes are substantial, they are unambiguous. 
More  ambiguous  are  two  levies  induced  by  support  for  Combined  Heat  and  Power 
(CHP)
12 and Renewables (RES)
13. These are not strictly speaking taxes, but the costs of 
CHP and RES are socialized over network-users and electricity-consumers respectively. 
It is clear from Figure 6 that whereas these costs are increasing steeply in relative terms, 
                                                 
12  Combined Heat and Power 
13  Renewable Energies   13 
they are unsubstantial in absolute terms. Yet, the industry sometimes justifies the price 
increases, especially the increased network charges, with these ‘tax’ increases. 
 





















The  development  of  the  network  charges  is  ambiguous.  Up  to  mid-2005  the 
network  charges  were  unregulated.  At  best,  one  could  argue  that  rather  loose  self-
regulation was enforced by either some threat of ex-post control by the cartel office, or 
by the threat of a change towards ex-ante regulation, which indeed happened in mid-
2005.  In  the  course  of  self-regulation  the  association  of  network  operators  (VDN) 
started to publish a standard format of a sample of network charges for different voltage 
levels twice a year. Examination of the LV network charges reveals that they were high 
in international comparison [cf. e.g. EC, 2005] and high relative to end-user prices [cf. 
Brunekreeft, 2002]. However, they have been stable since at least 2002. Only the HV-
level  has  seen  an  increase  of  about  10%  which  is  unsubstantial  in  absolute  terms. 
According to the network operators, this increase is just the cost-pass-through of higher 
balancing  costs  due  to  an  increase  in  intermittent  RES  generation.  A  study  of  the 
association of industrial users, VIK
14 suggests a recent increase in the network charges 
for industrial customers for selected networks. It is unclear whether the changes are 
representative for the sector. Growitsch & Wein [2004] calculate a reduction of the 
                                                 
14   Cf. www.vik-online.de, April 28, 2005.   14 
spread in network charges among various operators as a result of the introduction of the 
self-regulation in VV II+
15. This suggests that the increases by some are levelled out by 
decreases by others. All things considered, we should conclude that the recent increase 
in end-user prices cannot be explained by changes in network charges. 
Much  of  the  recent  price  increase  can  be  explained  by  the  wholesale  price 
development. We note that more than 90% is traded ‘over the counter’, for which we do 
not know the prices. However, we assume that the spot price at the European Energy 
Exchange (EEX) in Leipzig is a sufficiently good indicator for contract prices. Figure 7 
gives the EEX price development and clearly shows that the price is rising. 
 

































































































































The wholesale prices used to be very low. In fact, after liberalisation the prices went 
down  to  almost  short-run  marginal  costs  and  could  not  recover  total  costs.  This  is 
changing. With well over € 35/MWh, it is believed that full cost recovery has been 
restored. Why the recent increase? There are three plausible explanations. 
                                                 
15  VV abbreviates the German word Verbaendevereinbarung.    15 
First, with the start of emission trading (see below) the electricity wholesale 
price  now  includes  a  CO2  mark-up.  With  a  CO2-price  of  €  20/tonne  CO2  and  an 
emission factor for a coal plant of 0.75t/MWh, this amounts to a mark-up of €15/MWh 
on  the  wholesale  electricity  price.  If  gas  is  marginal,  then  the  mark-up  is  about  € 
7/MWh  because  the  emission  factor  of  gas  plants  is  about  0.35.  If  generation  is 
reasonably competitive then the CO2 mark-up would by and large be passed through 
into the EEX price. In either case, the effect of CO2 prices is substantial, as shown for 
real values in Figure 8. More importantly, Figure 7 suggests that if the CO2 mark-up is 
subtracted the net wholesale price fluctuates around €35/MWh, which corresponds by 
and large to the prices in 2004. 
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Source: Bremer Energie Institut (this was handed to the authors by Wolfgang Pfaffenberger) 
 
Second, the fuel prices have increased as depicted in Figure 9. For Germany the 
increase in gas and oil prices has less influence on wholesale prices because gas is not 
often marginal, but the world coal price has increased recently as well. 
   16 
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Source: BAFA (efficiency gas: 59%, coal: 45%) 
 
Third, for different reasons, the price increase may reflect a stronger control of 
the producers on the market, which at the very least seems to ease competitive pressure. 
Using  an  elaborate  electricity  market  model,  Müsgens  [2004]  makes  an  in-depth 
examination of costs, bidding and prices in the period from 2000 to mid-2003. He finds 
a structural break in early 2002. Before that prices were closely in line with system 
marginal costs, while from then on prices started to diverge from system marginal costs. 
Notably, the divergence is mostly in high demand periods. It does not follow though 
that these prices are excessive; as already noted, the early prices were too low to recover 
costs, whereas after early-2002, they might just recover full cost. 
Why  would  prices  start  to  diverge  from  system  marginal  costs?  Arguably, 
installed capacity in Germany was excessive, which was likely to increase competitive 
pressure and suppressed prices down to short run marginal costs. Around 2000, the two 
big players, E.On and RWE announced that they would shut down some 10 GW of 
plant capacity because prices were too low; part of this was decommissioned and part 
mothballed. In addition to other reasons a decline of excess capacity and the resulting 
relative  scarcity  are  likely  to  have  given  the  firms  some  grip  on  the  prices.
16 
Alternatively,  the  higher  prices  might  simply  reflect  emerging  scarcity  and  actually 
                                                 
16  In formal terms, mothballing capacity can be interpreted as a credible commitment not to use this 
capacity and it can thereby ease competitive pressure.   17 
signal that new investment is needed. Further, as shown in Table 2, concentration has 
increased around 2000 with the RWE-VEW (now RWE) and VEBA-VIAG (now E.On) 
mergers. With the HHI increasing from 1700 to 2600, theoretical insight and experience 
abroad would suggest a potential weakening of competitive pressure, as also suggested 
by Haas et.al. [2005]. Cross-border trade will certainly increase competitive pressure, 
but this is still limited. Table 1 shows that Germany is a net exporter, mainly because 
the prices in the Netherlands are higher than in Germany. Furthermore, cross-border 
capacity is only some 14% of total installed capacity. We would like to stress though 
that current wholesale prices (less of the CO2 mark up) do not seem to establish an 
abuse of market power.
17 
  Lastly, in 2001 a report of the Cartel Office made clear that network charges 
were high [Bundeskartellamt, 2001]. As a result the industry attempted to strengthen 
industrial self-regulation and started to publish the network charges systematically and 
in a comparable way. Pressure to regulate network access and network charges started 
to increase. The EU E-Directive 2003 removed negotiated TPA altogether and required 
regulation, which has now taken shape in Germany (see below). As argued extensively 
in Brunekreeft [2002 and 2004], given vertical  integration and the lack of effective 
regulation of network revenues, the rational strategy was to concentrate on the network 
while  keeping  the  margins  in  the  competitive  businesses  low  and  thereby  retaining 
market shares. As regulation of the network takes shape we would expect the reverse, 
i.e. an increase in both the wholesale and retail margins. 
The implications for new entry and investment follow swiftly. After the German 
market was liberalised in 1998, foreign companies showed especial interest in entering 
the German market. Although the German generation market was by far not as attractive 
as for example the Spanish or Italien markets in terms of wholesale price, the need for 
additional  capacity  or  expected  demand  growth,  many  companies  considered  it 
strategically  important  to  be  present  in  the  largest  European  electricity  market.  The 
large number of small and medium-sized utilities provided good take-over candidates. 
It took only a few years for this excitement to die down. This was partly because 
many new players like Enron or Dynegy either completely disappeared or were on the 
brink of disappearing. More importantly, the German market turned out to be hostile 
                                                 
17   This leaves the question open what exactly is market power and how prices above marginal costs can 
be stable in a competitive environment.   18 
towards new entry for a number of reasons. First, it was difficult to get hold of new 
plant sites. Second, as indicated above, wholesale prices were unattractively low. Third, 
in  the  first  few  years  after  liberalisation  the  arrangements  on  network  access  were 
biased  against  third  parties.  Fourth,  there  have  been  persistent  complaints  about 
discrimination of third parties. Fifth, as far as new entry from gas-fuelled CCGT is 
concerned, the big  electricity-gas merger E.On-Ruhrgas (controversially approved in 
2002) did not improve competitive conditions. Sixth, a gas tax represented a significant 
entry barrier for new gas plants. The gas tax increased the costs of a new CCGT plant 
by ca. 3 €/MWh or 10%. There were limited exemptions from the tax for new CCGT 
plants with an efficiency of more than 57.5%. Following a new European directive on 
energy taxation
18, this tax was abolished in 2005. 
Many new plant projects were either given up or had to look for new investors 
who were willing to keep these projects alive and wait for better times. New firms 
entered the market mainly through acquisitions; for instance EdF bought a minority 
stake in EnBW and Vattenfall took over Bewag, HEW and VEAG. This did not always 
improve competition, but rather increased the concentration in the wholesale market. 
While Germany has not seen many new plant projects that actually came on-line since 
market opening, investment activity is now picking up again  as we  will indicate in 
section 3.3. The wider wholesale margin is definitely helpful in this respect. 
3  Energy policies and the investment effect 
Before discussing energy policies in Germany in detail, Table 3 gives an overview of 
the main acts and events as they affect the ESI. 
3.1  The Energy Act 2005, regulation and the regulator BNA 
3.1.1  The Energy Act 2005 
  As explained above, for a variety of reasons, the Energy Act 1998 was replaced 
by the Energy Act 2005, with the following key elements. First, the approach of ex-ante 
approval of the methodology and ex-post control of the level did not survive the debate, 
and  a  clear  step  has  been  taken  towards  ex-ante  regulation  of  the  network  charges. 
Second, although starting off with a cost-based approach, it is an explicit intention of 
the authorities to switch to incentive-based regulation. Third, there will be a sector-
                                                 
18  Directive 2003/96/EG   19 
specific regulator: the Bundesnetzagentur (BNA). Fourth, the rules on unbundling are 
strengthened but they still only minimally fulfil the Directive’s requirements..
19 
 
Table 3:   Major Events in the German Electricity Supply Industry  
Date  Event  Comments 
April 1998  Amendment Energy 
Act, Start of 
liberalisation 
100% market opening in generation and supply 
May 1998  First Assocation 
Agreement VVI 
Self-regulation of networks 
April 1999  Introduction of the 
electricity tax 
Starting  with  1.02  c/kWh  and  gradually 
increased to 2.05 c/kWh. 
December 1999 Second Assocation 
Agreement VVII 
New  retailers  (eg.  Yello)  enter  the  market; 
prices drop severely and surprisingly, but only 
short-lived. 
April 2000  Renewable Energy Act  Fixed feed-in tariffs for renewables 
August 2000  European Energy 
Exchange in Frankfurt 
 
December 2001 New Nuclear Act  Stipulates  phase-out  of  nuclear  plants  in 
Germany, prohibits new nuclear plants 
April 2001  Report of the federal 
Cartel Office 
Indicates  that  network  charges  are  high  and 
difficult  to  control  by  Cartel  Office  by 
Competition Act. 
December 2001 Third Assocation 
Agreement VVII+ 
Stronger emphasis on industrial self-regulation 
2000/1  Mergers:  -  RWE and VEW: RWE 
-  VIAG and VEBA: E.On 
2002  Merger:  E.On and Ruhrgas 
December 2003 Monitoring-report by 
the Ministry of 
Economics 
This report confirms ‘officially’ that negotiated 
TPA  in  the  ESI  and  GSI  failed.  It  paves  the 
way to regulated TPA. 
January 2005  Emission Trading starts  
July 2005  Amendment of Energy 
Act, 
implementing EU directive, ending seven years 
of self-regulation of the network 
Regulator (BNA) takes over electricity network 
regulation 
 
                                                 
19   Haas et al [2005] are somewhat sceptical about the new Energy Act and point out that the legislator 
might have taken the opportunity to put in place a more pro-competitive market design.   20 
Ex-ante regulation of the network charges. 
Art. 23(2) of the EU E-Directive 2003 requires “fixing or approving, prior to their entry 
into  force,  at  least  the  methodologies  used  to  calculate”  the  network  charges.  The 
precise phrasing reflects the German wish to stick to ex post control of the level of the 
charges. In fact, this type of ex-ante/ex-post hybrid regulation has been practiced in, for 
instance, Sweden (with mixed success) and Finland (where it worked well). After a long 
debate, it has been decided in Germany that the by-pass in the Directive be ignored and 
the  ex-ante  regulation  of  the  level  of  the  access  charges  be  applied.  Thereby  the 
regulation of the network access charges is finally as it should be.
20 
  There has been some debate about controlling price increases only. This would 
imply that all current levels would be beyond the authority of the regulator. Since some 
network operators have increased their charges quite significantly over the last year (i.e. 
before  regulation  would  take  effect),  this  restriction  in  regulatory  authority  was 
unacceptable and was overthrown. The regulator has now been authorized to look back 
and control the recent price increases. 
Cost-based versus incentive-based regulation 
The main debate has been on the type of regulation. The formal current state is that 
regulation is cost based (par. 21), which reflects business as usual. Previously, the ‘self- 
regulation’ followed the accounting principles laid down in the association agreement. 
This is nothing else than a rate-of-return regulation, with the difference that it will now 
be enforced and resulting charges will have to approved before they enter into force.
21 
  The  legislator  explicitly  allows  the  option  to  switch  to  incentive-based 
regulation (par. 21a), which can be a price-cap or revenue-cap regulation. The regulator 
has  been  given  the  task  to  develop  an  incentive-regulation  mechanism.  However, 
whether, how and when this will be implemented is to be determined by the government 
in an ordinance (i.e. not by the regulator).
22  
                                                 
20  Increases  of  domestic  end-user  prices  required  approval  of  state  authorities  relying  on  a  federal 
decree. The enforcement of this decree has always been questioned. In any case, as a result of the new 
regulation of the network charges, this decree on end-user prices will expire in mid-2007. 
21  The interested reader may refer to Brunekreeft & Twelemann [2005, p. 109] for details. The new 
Energy Act is a step away from the controversial accounting of replacement value. Presumably the 
practical background is that replacement value can lead to a high RAB whereas the network may have 
completely depreciated. 
22  It may be noted as an aside that the policy uncertainty is striking: it is, at best, likely that regulation 
will be incentive-based in the future, but we do not know when or what it will look like. This may be 
compared to Norwegian legislation where the switch to incentive-based regulation in 1997 was laid 
down in 1991 in the law.   21 
  The  choice  between  cost-based  and  incentive-based  regulation  deserves 
attention. Incentive-based regulation aims at improving the incentives of the regulated 
firm to produce efficiently (i.e. cut costs). The means to do so is to allow the firm to 
keep the profits resulting from efficiency improvements. Not having to lower the (ex 
ante allowed) prices after lowering costs for some predetermined period is the incentive.  
The German Energy Act explicitly mentions incentive-based regulation, but as has been 
pointed out by Joskow [1989 and 2005b], it is not so clear what this means and how 
incentive-based differs from cost-based regulation.
23 Three points seem important. 
The  name  rate  of  return  regulation  (being  a  typical  form  of  cost-based 
regulation) suggests that prices should always be adjusted to costs so as to allow a 
reasonable rate of return. In practice this is not the case as rate-of-return regulation 
typically also fixes (weighted average) prices for some period of time: the regulatory 
lag. During this period prices can deviate from the ‘fair’ rate of return. The difference in 
emphasis is that under typical cost-based regulation the regulatory lag is endogenous 
and relatively short. As Joskow [1974] explains well, typically in the USA, (weighted 
average) prices remained fixed until either the firm or the regulator requested a rate 
hearing. An important innovation of the incentive-based regulation first introduced by 
Littlechild in 1983 was to make the regulatory lag explicit and exogenous as a closed 
regulatory contract [cf. Beesley & Littlechild, 1989]. 
A second point is that a cost-based approach typically adds a mark-up to the 
firm’s own costs. This is fair and reasonable but does little for the incentives to keep 
costs low. An incentive-based approach steps away from this and tries to avoid the use 
of the firm’s own costs as the benchmark. Instead it might use an industry benchmark. 
This retains the incentives but may lead to unreasonable results. These are theoretical 
polar cases; in practice the difference is blurred. Typically, with cost-based regulation, 
the regulator will look at whether the underlying costs are reasonable and thereby use 
comparators.  Also,  in  incentive-based  regulation  any  regulator  will  always  check 
whether the outcome for an individual firm is reasonable. 
A third point is that pure cost-based or pure incentive-based mechanisms only 
exist in textbooks. In practice details matter and we find all kinds of adjustments and 
                                                 
23  To be precise, incentive-based regulation is the overarching term of which pure cost-pass-through and 
pure price-cap are the polar cases [cf. Joskow, 2005b]. So, it is not really appropriate to contrast cost-
based with incentive-based. We will assume that in the Energy Act incentive regulation means a move 
towards price or revenue capping   22 
modifications and we see that the polar cases converge. Two examples are important. 
Rate-of-return  regulation  can  be  modified  by  a  use-and-useful  clause  [cf.  Joskow, 
1989], which basically says that the investment costs may only be passed through in the 
rate base if the investment is used and useful, on which the regulator decides. Clearly 
this  steps  away  from  pure  cost-based  regulation.  Incentive-based  regulation  can  be 
adjusted  by  profit-sharing  rules,  basically  saying  that  if  under  the  incentives-based 
constraint profits get either too large or too small, prices can (should) be adjusted. This 
clearly  adds  a  cost-based element.  Illustratively, Grout  &  Zalewska [2003] define  a 
profit-sharing  rule  as  a  weighted  average  of  the  outcomes  under  cost-based  and 
incentive-based regulation.
24 
  The Energy Act (para. 21a.2) highlights the ex-ante determination of the average 
revenue cap as the decisive point. The control period will be between 2 and 5 years. 
Furthermore, relative efficiency will be determined by benchmarking with comparable 
firms.
25  It  should  be  noted  though  that  this  also  holds  for  the  current  cost-based 
approach,  where  the  reasonableness  of  the  firm’s  own  costs  can  be  checked  by 
comparing  with  other  firms.  Moreover,  only  the costs  components  which  are  under 
control of the firms will be subject to efficiency incentives. 
Although without explicit details, the Act touches upon the following aspects. 
First, presumably the price-cap regulation will be tariff basket, capping the weighted 
average  price  of  a  basket  of  products  and  leaving  individual  prices  to  the  firms.
26 
Second, the regulation will explicitly be quality-adjusted, presumably with a penalty-&-
reward system. Third, it seems unlikely that there will be a yardstick; the Xi will be 
firm-individual or firms will be collected in comparable groups. The discussion on X 
versus Xi is non-trivial in the face of up to 900 networks. Faced with so many firms, a 
yardstick X for all is very attractive but seems unreasonable. 
Bundesnetzagentur (BNA). 
The  EU  E-Directive  2003  requires  with  art.  23(1)  regulatory  authorities,  “wholly 
independent from the interest of the electricity industry.” This excludes industrial self-
regulation as it was practiced in the German ESI, especially by means of the VVII+. 
                                                 
24  The distribution price control 2005-2010 in the UK provides interesting examples. 
25  There is some discussion to apply a virtual network approach as in Sweden to pre-select some very 
highly priced networks. 
26   This stands out against the regulation of telecommunications, which has a stronger leg in the 
regulation of individual prices.   23 
The new Energy Act creates the sector-specific regulator Bundesnetzagentur (BNA), 
which will include the regulator for gas, telecommunications and postal services and 
which will also cover railways. 
Authority has been split though. The federal regulator BNA is responsible for all 
network operators with more than 100,000 customers (and for network owners with less 
than 100,000 customers that operate in more than one state). The states are in charge of 
regulating smaller network operators. However, if desired, the states can hand over the 
regulation to the federal BNA
27. This follows article 15(2) in the EU E-Directive 2003, 
which exempts network operators with less than 100,000 customers from unbundling 
rules (except separate accounts). At least 500 networks are the responsibility of the 
states.
28 Because the communal lobby is very strong and states and municipalities are 
the main stakeholders in the DNOs, we may expect that state regulation of the DNOs 
will be weaker than federal regulation. 
It seems that all the regulators will have to follow the same federal ordinance 
concerning the choice of regulation. This is a missed opportunity. As pointed out the 
idea is to switch to incentive-based regulation. One of the problems is how to manage 
the regulation of 900,  mostly very  small DNOs. Exactly this problem could be by-
passed by applying different types of regulation: a strict incentive-based regulation at 
federal level and a ‘loose’ cost-plus approach at state level for many small utilities. If all 
the small DNOs are also regulated by the same type of incentive regulation, it is unclear 
what is gained with splitting up the authority, while it opens the door for regulatory 
capture at state level. 
Unbundling 
The unbundling requirements correspond to the EU Directive. Hence, the Energy Act 
requires legal (and functional and management) separation of TSO and DSO (with the 
art.  15(2)  exemptions  as  mentioned  above),  confidentiality  of  information  and 
accounting separation. This has by and large been implemented. The more urgent point 
is whether it will be enforced and controlled. As the regulator will pick up its task, we 
are confident that this will indeed be serious and that firewalls will start to be pressing. 
The more interesting question is whether ownership unbundling has any prospect. This 
question is aimed at the TSO in first instance. The legal problem is that the four TSOs 
                                                 
27  In summer 2005, most states have decided to keep a state regulator. 
28   However, the aggregate market covered by these firms will be small.   24 
are largely in private hands and that ownership unbundling is expropriation and violates 
the constitution. However, there are signs that ownership unbundling may re-emerge as 
an issue. First, there is some debate to split off the system operators (SO) from the rest 
of the firm and thus leave the transmission ownership (TO) to the current owners. This 
would  also  allow  the  creation  of  both  one  national  SO  and  one  national  balancing 
market. The SO has no assets and this approach would therefore most likely not be 
regarded as expropriation. Alternatively, all current firms could have the national SO in 
collective ownership. Second, experience in the UK, for instance, suggests that very 
strict firewalls can make ‘voluntary’ unbundling an attractive option for the companies. 
Typically, this requires very strict monitoring by the ‘watchdog’ and hence depends a 
great deal on the BNA. 
3.1.2  The institutional disequilibrium 
Why did the government decide not to regulate from the beginning of liberalisation? 
Recall that the German telecommunication sector does have sector-specific regulation 
by a  regulator. Although speculative, four  related arguments are apparent. First, the 
legislator may not have been completely benevolent. The sector’s influence on politics 
is  considerable.  Second,  the  energy  sector  (gas  and  electricity)  is  considered  to  be 
strategic. Faced with counterparties like Gazprom, the government hesitates to fragment 
the industry too heavily and tries to balance between different goals (in this case, in 
particular between competition and countervailing power). Third, there has also been 
the desire to create and support ‘national champions’ able to compete on a European 
scale.  Fourth,  after  re-unification  the  firms  from  the  West  committed  to  investing 
heavily in the former East in order to modernize both plants and networks. Oddly, this 
did not result in stranded-costs claims when liberalization started, unless we should 
interpret the lack of regulation as such. 
  In any case, only seven years after liberalisation, the institutional framework was 
adjusted to adopt ex-ante regulation of the network charges. Hence, we may conclude 
that the framework was not in equilibrium and that something went wrong.
29  
  Changes in the ESI are at least partly a spin-off of the gas supply industry (GSI). 
The GSI  as well as the ESI was supposed to  develop an association  agreement for 
network access. Whereas this by and large succeeded for the ESI, this failed in the GSI,   25 
leaving the government no option but to intervene. However, as this contribution is on 
the ESI, we will continue with an examination of the developments in the ESI.
30 
High network charges are against consumers’ interests, but as long as they are 
within a reasonable range they are unlikely to arouse too much political attention. More 
important  is  that  competition  died  off  after  a  first  wave  of  excitement.  Retail 
competition for domestic users is problematic. Switching rates are low and third party 
suppliers are in financial distress. Although consumers perhaps do not switch because 
they are satisfied with their incumbent supplier and although potential competition may 
work, we observe that active competition is not a great success. Müller & Wienken 
[2004] estimate that roughly 40% of the household market is effectively closed, because 
the margin is below cost. 
  The developments on the wholesale market were similar and highly remarkable 
(see  above).  Undoubtedly  there  has  been  quite  strong  competition,  which  in  the 
beginning  resulted  in  renegotiation  of  old  contracts  by  large  users  (industry  and 
retailers). The presence of competition and traders acted as a threat in the bargaining 
game. The prices for large users, which are an indicator for wholesale prices, came 
down strongly, presumably squeezing out the air resulting from productivity increases 
made in the 1990s and which had not been passed through. As shown in Figure 7 above, 
wholesale prices at the power exchange in Leipzig were very low; as low as fuel costs 
and substantially below cost recovery. This short-lived success has depressed entry: the 
first six or seven years of liberalization have not or have hardly seen third parties in 
generation and most planned projects were never realised. If anything, firms left the 
market, while the assets in the market became more concentrated through mergers and 
acquisitions. The low entry activity reflects different issues. The low wholesale price, 
policy uncertainty about next institutional steps (regulation or not) and discriminatory 
behaviour by the network operators will all have contributed to hesitant new entry. As 
we will discuss in section 3.3, this is now changing.  
Weak  regulation  of  a  strongly  vertically  integrated  industry  (and  weak 
enforcement of unbundling) implied difficult times for competition. Complaints about 
discrimination against third parties have been persistent. Indeed, the first association 
                                                                                                                                               
29  We have studied this in detail elsewhere [cf. eg. Brunekreeft, 2002 and 2003], and we will summarize 
it here briefly. 
30  The  interested  reader  may  refer  to  Brunekreeft  &  Twelemann  [2005,  section  2.2]  and  references 
quoted therein for further details on the GSI.   26 
agreement was most certainly not pro-competitive. Moreover, during the first years after 
market opening, the Cartel Office has been active to settle unresolved issues and pursue 
abusive behaviour. Moreover, the institutional framework of vertical integration without 
effective regulation of the network charges created the incentives for a margin squeeze: 
in case of doubt, the integrated firms will make (excess) profits on the network, not on 
the commercial business. The resulting low margins were unattractive for third parties.  
  Summing  up  all  the  points  above,  we  conclude  that  among  other  effects, 
effective regulation will widen the retail and generation margin (i.e. higher wholesale 
prices) and make abuse of the network or system-operation more difficult. All in all, 
effective regulation will promote new entry in generation and retail and thereby promote 
new investment. 
3.1.3  Regulation and network investment 
Regulation  and  the  choice  between  cost-based  or  incentive-based  have  potentially 
substantial effects on network investment. Incentive-based may be good for short-run 
efficiency but may impede long-run network investment. Recall from section 3.1.2 that 
the  difference  between  cost-based  and  incentive-based  is  not  clear-cut  but  rather  a 
gradual matter of accents; the same applies for the reflections below.  
It is not implausible that the explicit step of creating regulation and a regulator 
as  already carried out by the Energy Act decreases (policy or regulatory) uncertainty. 
This  can  have  a  stimulating  effect  on  investment.  A  second  effect  concerns  the 
institutional  choice  for  the  BNA,  which  is  part  of  the  Ministry  of  Economics. 
Independence, being one of the leading regulatory principles, is thereby violated. How 
this could work out depends on the interests of the Ministry. Although it does have 
stakes,  the  federal  Ministry  is  not  a  major  shareholder  in  the  power  industry;  the 
Ministry’s primary interest will be the consumer. This implies that the regulator might 
be  under  political  pressure  to  lower  the  network  charges  if  this  is  politically 
opportune.
31  
Other  effects  concern  the  choice  between  cost-based  and  incentive-based 
regulation. Though being still ambiguous in an empirical sense, cost-based approaches 
are seen as inefficient and generally wasteful of resources (gold-plating) and dependent 
                                                 
31  This contrasts to telecommunications, where the government was the major shareholder of Deutsche 
Telekom, although its stakes reduced gradually by floating the shares. Furthermore, the situation is in   27 
on details biased towards over-capitalization; this was one of the drivers to move away 
from  cost-based  approaches  [cf.  Beesley  &  Littlechild,  1989,  p.456].  The  long-run 
perspective reverses the argument. Gold-plating may be inefficient but might be good 
for investment. 
Gilbert & Newbery [1994] point out that, in an uncertain world, the expected 
deviations from the reasonable outcome are smaller under cost-based regulation than 
under  incentive-based  regulation.  Importantly,  this  increases  the  credibility  of  the 
regulator  to  stick  to  previously  announced  policies.  In  other  words,  incentive-based 
regulation can impede network investment as it reduces the regulator’s credibility. 
Peltzman [1976] pointed out the ‘buffering hypothesis’, which means that rate-
of-return  regulation  reduces  the  firm’s  exposure  to  market  risk  as  compared  to  no 
regulation. Wright et.al. [2003] extend the argument for price-cap regulation. In terms 
of  demand  uncertainty,  risk  under  the  price-cap  regulation  is  lower  than  without 
regulation, similar to rate-of-return regulation. In contrast, in terms of cost uncertainty, 
risk under price-cap regulation is higher than without regulation. The arguments imply 
that the firm’s risk-adjusted cost of capital might be higher under price-cap regulation. 
All else equal, this means that investment may be lower under price-cap regulation. 
Lastly,  as  Spence  [1975]  pointed  out  incentive-based  regulation  has  poor 
incentives for investing in quality. A price-cap regulated firm can increase profits at the 
expense of quality. Regulators in the Netherlands, Norway and the UK, for instance, 
have adjusted the price-cap regulation for quality incentives. The new Energy Act in 
Germany allows the BNA to make the necessary quality adjustments. 
As argued in section 3.1.2, what we would expect is that if long-term network 
investment becomes more important relative to short-term efficiency, incentive-based 
regulation  will  be  modified  to  cost-based  type  of  regulation  and  quality-adjusted 
regulation. It appears that this is happening in the UK where the new distribution price 
controls which came into force in April 2005 included sliding scales and used-and-
useful test for capital overspending. 
3.2  The policy on renewables, CHP and the CO2 emission trading scheme 
German environment-related policy has the following targets: 
                                                                                                                                               
contrast to the state level; the states are stakeholders in the power industry, and there we might see the 
directions go the other way around.   28 
•  Under  the  EU  burden  sharing  agreement  to  implement  the  Kyoto  climate 
protocol,  Germany  has  committed  itself  to  reducing  its  greenhouse  gas 
emissions  by  21%  between  2008  and  2010,  as  compared  to  the  1990/1995 
emission levels. 
•  Combined  heat  and  power  (CHP)  generation  is  to  play  an  important  role  in 
achieving these targets. In accordance with the national CO2 reduction strategy 
the  electricity  supply  industry  committed  itself  to  reducing  CO2  emissions 
through an increase of CHP generation by at least 20 mio. tons by 2010, which 
would mean nearly a doubling of CHP generation to 20% in 2010 compared to 
2002  levels.  According  to  the  CHP  Act,  CO2  emissions  are  to  be  reduced 
through an increase of CHP generation (10mio. t by 2005; 23mio. t by 2010). 
•  The red-green government aimed at doubling the share of renewables by 2010 
from 5% to 10%. 
3.2.1  Support for Renewables and Combined Heat and Power 
Renewables  (RES)  and  Combined  Heat  and  Power  (CHP)  are  supported  by  the 
Renewable Energy Act (EEG) and the CHP Act respectively. The support mechanisms 
for EEG and CHP plants are basically a subsidy, although different in detail. While 
EEG  plants  get  a  fixed  remuneration  depending  on  technology  and  plant  size,  the 
payment for CHP plants varies with the market price. 
CHP in Germany has a production share of 10%, of which 60% is gas- and 40% 
coal- or lignite-fuelled (Figure 2). Support for CHP is a plain subsidy over and above 
the  market  wholesale  price.  The  arrangement  is  the  result  of  stranded  cost 
compensation, after it turned out that CHP became unprofitable after liberalization. The 
CHP Act applies only to CHP plants that were in operation when the Act entered into 
force and will be phased out. The Act does only apply to new plants if they replace 
exiting plants (modernisation) and for small CHP plants below 2 MWel and fuel cells. 
As a result, the CHP Act does little for investment which expands CHP capacity. 
RES  are  promoted  by  the  RES  Act  (EEG),  which  arranges  a  feed-in  charge 
system with a take-off obligation: a “take and pay” system. Like the CHP support now, 
the pre-liberalisation system used to be a predetermined subsidy on the ‘market price’. 
With liberalisation the market prices and thereby the feed-in charging fell substantially, 
pushing the RES plants into financial distress and suppressing new investment. The 
government decided to change the system by fixing the feed-in charges independent of   29 
market developments. The feed-in payments are generous, with a minimum payment of 
€c 5.5/kWh for wind and €c 43.4/kWh for solar. The support mechanism distinguishes 
between technologies, vintages and sites, thereby increasing overall efficiency. 
The costs of the feed-in mechanism are socialized over all end-users. Whilst 
under the old pre-liberalisation mechanism, each DNO had to bear the total costs of 
renewables in their area individually, the EEG has established a mechanism whereby 
the costs are spread country-wide. The distribution network operator (DNO), to which 
the RES plant is connected, is obliged to take-off the energy, but passes this on to the 
transmission system operator (TNO) to which it is connected. The TSOs spread the 
burden  equally  among  themselves  and  calculate  a  nationwide  compensation  charge. 
They then pass it on proportionally to the suppliers in their region, who in turn pay the 
compensation charge and pass-through the costs into the end-user price. In 2004, the 
share of RES was about 9% and the calculated compensation charge 9 €c/kWh; with a 
wholesale price of 3.3 €c/kWh, this amounts to a ‘RES tax’ of 0.51 €c/kWh.
32 
A  ‘take  and  pay’  system  of  feed-in  charges  and  take-off  obligation  affects 
competition only in an indirect fashion. The system implies that RES and conventional 
sources  do  not  compete directly.  Indirectly,  the  conventional  suppliers  face  reduced 
residual demand (which is total demand minus the exogenous supply of RES), which 
brings  the  price  down.  Also,  we  should  expect  that  as  the  capacity-load-margin 
increases  (excess  capacity),  competitive  pressure  increases,  which  further  reduces 
prices. Moreover, under a system of fixed feed-in charges and take-off obligation the 
RES do not directly compete with each other. If the share of RES is moderate this is 
acceptable, but if the share is substantial a large part of the market will effectively be 
exempted from competition. If the RES share grows, the designs of the market, network 
regulation and a RES support mechanism might need to be reconsidered.  
Network connection charges are shallow, meaning that new generation assets 
only pay for the cost of connecting to the first network connection point, whereas the 
costs  of  network  upgrades  beyond  this  connection  point  are  borne  by  the  network 
operator. The network operators are obliged to connect new plant as long as the request 
is reasonable and, if necessary, undertake network enforcements. There is a new debate, 
however,  about  an  estimated  €  800m  for  an  HV  network  upgrade  which  would  be 
                                                 
32 Compare Haas et.al. [2005] for an overview and impression of European policies and experiences.   30 
necessary to facilitate offshore wind projects. Evidently, the industry argues to pass-
through these costs. 
Plants connected to the distribution network (distributed generation), including 
CHP and RES, receive a network charge rebate. The calculation of grid charges is based 
on the assumption that all electricity is fed into the high-voltage transmission grid. The 
payment  from  the  distribution  network  operator  (DNO)  to  the  transmission  system 
operator (TSO), however, is based on the actual annual peak load which the DNO gets 
from the TSO, reduced by a coincidence factor. As a result, if there are plants connected 
to the distribution network, the payment which the DNO receives from grid users may 
exceed  the  charges  he  has  to  pass  through  to  the  TSO.  DG  receives  these  avoided 
network charges. More generally though, while the support for renewables does lead to 
more decentralised generation, there is no explicit policy on distributed generation yet. 
3.2.2  CO2 emission trading 
Emission trading started at the beginning of 2005, as part of a European-Union-wide 
emission trading scheme. The first trading period is a pilot phase, lasting until 2007. 
The second trading period will last from 2008 until 2012. Each EU member state had to 
draw up a national allocation plan, defining the overall emission targets for the various 
sectors  (macro  plan),  including  the  targets  for  those  sectors  covered  by  the  ETS 
(industry, energy), and the method of allocating CO2 permits to individual plants (micro 
plan). 
The  allocation  of  permits  to  individual  plants  is  based  on  two  principles: 
grandfathering based on historical values for existing plants and a kind of benchmarking 
for  new  plants.  Permits  are  allocated  to  existing  plants  on  the  basis  of  historical 
emissions  multiplied  by  a  reduction  factor,  whereas  new  plants  receive  the  permits 
based on their expected emissions with an upper limit set by modern coal plants and a 
lower limit set by CCGTs. In both cases, permits are allocated free of charge.  
How will the allocation plan affect investment in new power plants and thereby 
the environment, generation adequacy and competition? The leading principle is that 
irrespective of whether the CO2 permits are auctioned or are free of charge, there is an 
opportunity cost corresponding to the market price of the permits, pushing up marginal 
costs.  They  will  thus  be  passed  through  into  the  electricity  wholesale  price.  If  the 
permits are auctioned then evidently they are real (variable) costs. If the firms receive   31 
the permits free-of-charge they earn windfall profits equal to the quantity of permits 
times the price. 
The more relevant effect is on new investment. The CO2 price as such has a 
merit-order effect: it makes gas less expensive compared to coal in terms of marginal 
costs,  which  may  increase  the  load  factor  of  gas  plants  and  thereby  reduces  their 
average  costs.  For  an  investment  decision  the  windfall  profit  translates  into  lower 
investment cost. Brunekreeft & Twelemann (2005) calculate the entry price, which is 
the price at which a new investment just recovers full cost.
33 Receiving a number of 
permits  works  out  as  lowering  fixed  investment  costs  and  increasing  variable 
(opportunity) costs.
34 Lower effective investment costs make it more likely that new 
plants will be able to compete against existing plants. For existing machines the lower 
investment costs are bygones and the windfall  profits can be passed through to the 
shareholders. For new entrants it makes a difference in the investment decision. For this 
reason, the free allocation of permits stimulates entry with new investment. 
If the initial allocation is free of charge, money flows into the system. As long as 
entry  is  possible  and  rewarded  with  new  permits,  this  leads  to  excessive  entry  and 
capacity. In the long run, the profitability of plants is brought back to a normal rate of 
return by (inefficiently) low load factors. At least initially new entry is likely to be more 
efficient with lower specific CO2-emissions and thus existing plants are likely to face 
the lower load factor; one would anticipate the early retirement of these plants.  
Although auctioning the permits is superior from an efficiency point of view, 
allocating  the  permits  free  of  charge  stimulates  new  investment  (more  and  sooner) 
which is good for competition and supply security. The effect on technology is less 
optimistic. As soon as allocation deviates from ‘best practice’ (product benchmark) and 
instead  differentiates  between  different  technologies  (technology  benchmark),  the 
technology choice is distorted. The relative advantage new RES should have under a 
system of auctioned CO2 permits vanishes, if the permits are allocated free of charge 
and according to a technology benchmark. Furthermore, if the permits are allocated 
                                                 
33  There are two key numbers, reflecting the merit-order effect. For an CO2 price of less than €30/tCO2 
the entry price is about €52/MWh due to a low load factor. With an CO2 price of more than €30/tCO2 
the entry price is about €36/MWh, with a high load factor. The numbers are sensitive to assumed fuel 
prices and efficiency levels. Compare also Pfaffenberger & Hille [2003] for similar findings. 
34  An alternative way of reasoning (leading to the same result) is to argue via the revenue side of Net 
Present Value. Allocating the permits free of charge does not have an effect on expenses, but it does 
increase market price. Hence, the system will make new investment more attractive than it otherwise 
would be.   32 
according to a technology benchmark (by and large corresponding to the emission rate 
of  state-of-the-art  machines),  then  replacing  an  old  inefficient, high-carbon  machine 
with a new efficient, low-carbon machine implies less permits, which in turn means 
smaller windfalls. At the very least, this postpones the replacement.  
Art. 10 of the German National Allocation Act specifies a transfer rule, which 
addresses this problem. If an old plant is replaced by a new plant, the permits of the old 
plant can be transferred to the new plant for four years. In an insightful study, Bode et 
al. (2005) argue that transfer rule heavily distorts competition as it puts new entrants 
(who cannot ‘replace old machines’)  at a disadvantage:  for the same investment an 
incumbent replacing its old machine would get more CO2 permits then an entrant not 
replacing an old machine. Somewhat surprising though, Bode et.al. (2005) also claim 
that (with unlimited validity of the transfer rule) the transfer rule does not speed up 
replacement. This counterintuitive claim seems to be due to fact that the analysis lacks 
an explicit dynamic factor and thus a timing problem. Explicitly including a dynamic 
factor and timing (e.g. demand growth or cost-reducing learning) repairs this point and 
causes the transfer rule to speed up replacement. 
  Overall  we  conclude  that  a  system  allocating  CO2  permits  free  of  charge 
(inefficiently) supports competition with new entry and generation adequacy. The effect 
on the environment is less clear. Having a CO2-system at all evidently supports the 
environment,  but  technology  benchmarking  may  well  have  detrimental  effects.  The 
transfer rule is good for the environment but may damage competition too much.  
3.3  Generation adequacy 
3.3.1  Hands-off policy on generation adequacy 
The power crisis in California in 2000/1, the power black-outs in New York, London, 
and Italy in 2003 and many near black-outs in recent years triggered concerns about the 
incentives of the liberalized power markets to provide adequate capacity. The overall 
issue  is  reliability,  including  both  generation  and  networks.  We  concentrate  on 
generation here; an impression of the network side has been given in section 2.1.4. 
Reliability in turn covers two aspects: security and adequacy. Supply security is the 
ability  of  the  system  to  respond  to  short  term  disturbances;  this  requires  sufficient 
reserve capacity and is typically the system operators’ task. Supply adequacy (or, in our 
case generation adequacy) reflects sufficient long-term investment in such a way that   33 
the system functions under standard conditions; this begs the question as to whether the 
market provides sufficient incentives to invest. 
  This is controversial and the impression is that policy makers in the USA are 
less  confident  in  the  market  than  in  Europe.  A  primary  problem  is  fluctuating  and 
uncertain demand (and of course, the fact that electricity power cannot be stored and the 
fact that supply should  meet demand at all times), which implies that there will be 
peaking units with a very low load factor. In other words, the costs of a peaking plant 
should be recovered in only a couple of hours. If we assume, for instance, that a peaking 
plant has annualized costs of €40,000/MW/a, we need 10 hours per year and a price as 
high €4,000/MWh to recover costs. If generation units are paid only for real production, 
then the prices are called energy-only prices. A system of energy-only prices is typically 
what the spontaneous market design will be. 
Theory  predicts  that  scarcity  will  push  up  prices,  which  will  attract  new 
investment which in turn will reduce scarcity and so on, until an equilibrium is found. 
This is convincing, yet there are reasons to be cautious. Individual consumers cannot (at 
least not in current circumstances) be shut down individually; hence consumers have 
weak incentives to contract for (reserve) capacity. Two points weaken this argument. 
First,  if  large  consumers  can  be  shut  down  individually,  the  total  market  may  be 
sufficiently responsive; the question is what is sufficient? Second, developments with 
so-called smart meters, which can be used to disconnect individual households, are fast. 
A further argument why markets may be slow to respond to scarcity prices is these very 
high prices are simply unrealistic [Joskow, 2003]. Joskow & Tirole [2004] point out that 
even  such  very  extreme  situations  and  subsequent  extremely  high  prices  are  very 
sensitive to the discretionary behaviour of the TSO. Furthermore, most systems have a 
maximum price; in many parts of the USA, bids are capped at $1,000/MWh. And even 
if they are not capped explicitly, there is justified concern that prices higher than this 
might  trigger  government  interference.  As  pointed  out  in  Brunekreeft  &  McDaniel 
[2005] this may be a vicious circle ending in a low-capacity equilibrium. 
  We  see  the  academic  controversy  reflected  in  policy,  where  there  is  a  wide 
variety of policy measures. In the USA, a system with capacity obligations is popular. 
In Europe, concern has been expressed by the European Commission with its supply 
security package of December 2003. Some countries in Europe have explicit policies 
like  capacity  payments  (e.g.  Spain)  or  reserve  contracting  (Sweden  and  the   34 
Netherlands
35). Most countries however have a hands-off policy: i.e. explicitly doing 
nothing (except perhaps monitoring) and leaving it to the market (e.g. Norway and the 
UK). 
  The German approach is also hands-off although it has not been made explicit. 
The background is more practical; Germany has a long tradition of excess capacity on 
which the system still relies and the investment question is not yet urgent. Para. 51 of 
the Energy Act requires the monitoring of supply security by the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, and in the case of installed capacity (taking account of interruptible contracts) 
not  being  adequate,  para.  53  then  allows  the  government  to  organize  a  tender  for 
additional capacity, in line with art. 7 of the EU E-Directive 2003. It is safe to conclude 
that generation adequacy is not a policy issue in Germany yet. 
3.3.2  Generation capacity and investment in Germany 
Is this justified? Basically we observe that (as elsewhere) both investment levels and 
generation reserve margins have dropped in the last 5 to 10 years. However, in recent 
years, both have been restored. The reserve margin in Germany has been studied closely 
in Brunekreeft & Twelemann [2005] and it seems that all that has happened is that 
excess capacity has been reduced without endangering continuity of supply. Yet at some 
point  new  investment  is  required.  First,  to  meet  new  demand.  Second,  to  adjust  to 
technological progress (certainly eyeing the environment). Third, provided that phasing 
out  goes  ahead  as  planned,  to  replace  the  nuclear  power  plants  which  are  to  be 
decommissioned.  Fourth,  to  replace  old  and  depreciated  machines.  Table  4  below 
suggests that a large share of the generation plants in Germany is rather old and will 
need to be replaced soon. 
 
                                                 
35 The system in the Netherlands has been designed but the required additional reserve capacity has 
currently been set to zero, and hence  the system is inactive at the moment.   35 
Table 4:   Age of German generation plants  
Type    > 30 yrs    30 -10 yrs    < 10 yrs 
Hard coal    10635    17457    768 
Lignite    9570    6207    5465 
Nuclear    2223    21340    0 
Gas    7291    6980    3293 
Oil    4879    2044    39 
Other    183    1109    1853 
Source: Ziesing & Matthes, “Energiepolitik”, DIW-Wochenbericht 48/2003. 
 
As  mentioned  before,  though,  investment  activity  is  picking  up
36.  Figure  10 
shows how investment fell steeply after the all time high following re-unification. But 
clearly, the fall halted and in the meantime and investment is increasing again. Further, 
the  increased  wholesale  prices  make  new  projects  attractive  and  indeed  attract  new 
entry.  There  are  projects  by  companies  like  Statkraft,  yet  the  most  interesting 
development  comes  from  mainly  municipal  distributors/retailers  joining  forces  and 
investing in new generation plants. Examples are Trianel and SüdWestStrom. A reason 
which is sometimes heard is to reduce the dependence on the big producers, from which 
we may conclude that competition has not been working all that well. A problem for 
new entrants has been the availability of sites for power plants. While completely new 
sites are difficult to find and often meet the resistance of the local public, existing sites 
are difficult to get hold of because they are in most cases controlled by the incumbents. 
For example, there was interest from municipal utilities in the south to build a CCGT 
plant on the Obrigheim site, a decommissioned nuclear plant. Yet EnBW who owns the 
site,  refused  to  make  it  available  for  such  a  project,  putting  forward  grid-related 
arguments. Lastly, the regulator and regulation should be expected to ease new entrants’ 
lives and as explained the CO2 ETS as well as the RES policy appears to suppport new 
investment. All in all, the German ESI may need new investment but it is likely to 
come. 
 
                                                 
36  See  for  example  the  August  2005  investment  survey  among  200  industry  done  by  ZEW 
(www.zew.de).   36 
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3.3.3  New capacity: gas or coal? 
For several years after liberalisation, gas-fuelled CCGT was seen as basically the only 
option for new plants. In 1991, the European Commission lifted restrictions on the use 
of gas for electricity production. Gas prices were relatively low. With CCGT, new gas-
fuelled  technology  was  highly  efficient.  The  relatively  low  capital  costs  and  short 
construction  times  and  life  duation  made  new  gas  an  attractive  investment  in  the 
liberalised market. 
However,  coal  and  lignite  are  on  the  rise  again,  at  least  in  terms  of 
announcements and expectations. Even EnBW in the south of Germany ponders the 
possibility of building new coal plants, although not that long ago transportation costs in 
this region, which is far from both domestic and imported coal, were thought to be 
prohibitive. CCGT plants still benefit from high fuel efficiency and low capital costs, 
but the high gas price has turned against it. Gas projects have also suffered from the 
lack of gas network regulation and problems with third party access, a situation that can 
be expected to be improved by the new Energy Regulator. This particular problem was 
presumably worsened by the controversially approved E.On-Ruhrgas merger, in as far 
as new entry was expected to be with gas-fuelled plant. The European Commission is 
worried about a high European gas import-dependence (from northern-Africa, Russia   37 
and the Middle-East). Alternatives are for instance to rely more strongly on LNG and 
more on indigenous sources like coal. 
On  the  other  hand,  as  becomes  clear  from  Figure  9  hard  coal  prices  are 
increasing  as  well.  Heavily  increased  demand  from  especially  China  has  increased 
upward pressure on the coal price. There are also increasing costs of transportation, 
apparently especially due to the Chinese claim on shipping of steel. It is sometimes 
expected that the high coal price will not last, due, for instance, to exploitation of new 
mines and transportation capacity, while gas prices are expected to remain high. 
The  CO2  ETS  makes  coal  relatively  more  expensive  compared  to  gas.
37 
However, the CO2 price must be rather high to have a significant effect. On the other 
hand, if fuel efficiency increases, ceteris paribus CO2 emission per MWh goes down. 
Although the same holds for CCGT, rather strong technological advances are expected 
in more efficient coal and lignite plants (supercritical plant and clean-coal technology) 
[cf. e.g. Bode, et. al., 2005]. 
While both hard coal and gas can be bought on the market and are potential 
options for new entrants, lignite is a different game. As it is too expensive to transport 
lignite over long distances, due to its low energy density, lignite plants are generally 
located right next to the mine, the mines are owned by the generators and the fuel is 
shovelled  from  the  mine  into  the  plant  without  going  through  any  form  of  market. 
Consequently, the marginal costs of lignite plants are anyone’s guess. For new entrants, 
there is no way they can get access to lignite and new lignite plants will be built by the 
incumbents. Currently, it is mainly RWE that is about to replace its old plants by new 
ones. 
We conclude that the future of coal as a fuel for the German ESI looks brighter 
than  is  sometimes  thought.  Looking  at  projects  under  construction  and  announced 
projects from mid 2005, gas and coal have about the same share (see Table 5). 
 
                                                 
37  However, coal does not contain methane (CH4) which puts coal at a relative advantage if methane 
should be part of an emission scheme.   38 
Table 5:   Power plant projects in Germany  
Project  name/ 
location 






Hamm  Trianel  Gas-
CCGT 
  800  Under  construction.  28 
municipal  utilities  from 
Germany,  Austria  and  the 
Netherlands  have  shares  in 
this project, to  go on-online 





  800  Project was taken over from 
Intergen 












  800   




  400   
Lingen  RWE  Gas 
CCGT 
  800 
 -1000 
 
Boxberg  Vattenfall 
Europe 
Lignite    700  Additional capacity, not 
replacing old lignite plants 
Neurath  RWE  Lignite    1100  
or 2200 
Replacing old lignite units 
Karlsruhe/ 
Heilbronn 
EnBW  Hard Coal 
and/or 
Gas 
  No final decision on fuel yet, 
coal  would  have  relatively 





400-800  No final decision on fuel yet, 
coal  would  have  relatively 
high  transport  costs, 
municipality-based company 
?  Trianel   Hard Coal  700-800  As  with  the  Trianel  CCGT 
project,  municipal  utilities 
can buy shares in this project 
Datteln  Eon  Hard coal    1000  Replacing  a  300  MW  coal 
plant 
Hamm  RWE  Hard coal  2*  750   
Hamburg  Vattenfall 
Europe 
Hard Coal    700   
Source: Company information, various sources 
 
4  Concluding remarks 
This contribution examines energy policy in Germany. The primary focus is on the 
effect of various policies, which directly or indirectly relate to the energy market, on   39 
investment  in  the  Electricity  Supply  Industry  (ESI)  in  Germany.  Investment  in  turn 
affects competition, environment and supply adequacy. The policies we examine are 
threefold. 
First, we study the policy related to liberalisation and regulation of the ESI. On 
July 13, 2005 a new Energy Act entered into force implementing the EU Directive of 
2003. The key point of the new Energy Act is to remove negotiated Third Party Access 
and instead establish regulated Third Party Access. It can be concluded that the previous 
system which did not have effective regulation did not work. Network charges are high 
both in international comparison and relative to the end-user price. Competitive margins 
are low, which impedes effective competition. The new system installs a sector-specific 
regulator  (BNA)  and  regulation.  The  regulation  is  as  yet  cost-based,  but  the  Act 
explicitly allows the option to switch to ex-ante, incentive-based regulation. In practice 
this means a shift of emphasis towards ex-ante, forward-looking capping of revenues for 
a  predetermined  period  and  presumably  a  stronger  reliance  on  benchmarking  of 
different firms.  
As  set  out  extensively  in  this  contribution,  we  expect  that  the  regulation  of 
network access will strongly support the development of competition in both generation 
and retail; we already observe that investment activity in generation assets is starting to 
take off. On the other hand, it can be argued for a variety of reasons that the shift 
towards incentive-based regulation, which aims at short run efficiency, tends to have 
detrimental effects on (long run) network investment. This can be defended though, 
because currently the networks are viewed as being in good shape albeit inefficient and 
the Energy Act does allow quality adjusted regulation. 
Second,  Germany  has  a  strong  tradition  of  supporting  the  environment.  The 
policies on renewables (RES), combined heat and power (CHP) and the CO2 emission 
trading are dominating the debate at the moment. The support schemes and network-
connection arrangements for RES and CHP, although with different background, are 
generous and should be expected to support further new investment. The costs of the 
schemes  are  passed  through  to  end-users  and  network  charges  respectively. 
Examination reveals that the numbers are too small to make RES and CHP responsible 
for the recent increase of end user prices. The CO2 price is surprisingly high and as the 
German power production relies on coal the CO2 mark up in Germany is high as well. 
Exactly  this  seems  to  explain  much  of  the  recent  price  increase.  The  system  of 
allocating the CO2 permits free of charge, whilst inefficient, stimulates new investment   40 
and thereby promotes competition and supply adequacy. Oddly, as a consequence of 
having a technology benchmark, the new investment need not be in clean technology. 
Third, despite controversial debate on generation adequacy elsewhere, Germany 
has no explicit policy on generation adequacy. Leaving the theoretical question as to 
whether the energy-only market will provide sufficient capacity aside, we observe that 
capacity margins and investment levels have dropped in the last six or seven years, but 
have  been  restored  recently.  Moreover,  generation  assets  in  Germany  are  old  and 
replacement and modernization are required soon. At the same time, we observe that 
investment activity (at least announced) is definitely picking up again. Challenging the 
conventional wisdom that gas will dominate the future, it seems that hard coal has a 
brighter future than sometimes thought. 
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